Pyongyang Report V10N1 May 2008

PyongyangVol 10 No 1 May 2008

· Pyongyang Report enters tenth year

· Commentary: On the brink - Prospect= s for US-DPRK settlement dim, yet again

· News Reports<= /p>

o&nb= sp; US-DPRK negotiations and the curiou= s Syrian affair

o&nb= sp; IT outsourcing in DPRK

o&nb= sp; NZ teacher returns to Pyongyang

Pyongyang Report<= /i> enters tenth year

Pyongyang Report enters its tenth year in 2008. Our first issue came out 29 January 1999. At that time, although we published simultaneously on the web, we were thinking primarily in terms of a printed version. Our main aim was to bring together extract from international media stories that would stimulate the New Zealand media to approach DPRK more critically and discerningly. There is a world beyond clich&eacu= te; and propaganda was the message. Since we were aiming at the media we needed to produce something whi= ch was up-to-date (the media hates stale stories), and so had to come out fair= ly frequently. We decided four p= ages would be the limit. Short and frequent was the model.

Time passed. We were spectacularly ineffective = with the media. NZ media coverage is no more informed or thoughtful than it was then. We also found it increa= singly difficult to come out frequently. Pressure of other commitments, and foreign travel, meant that the ga= ps between editions was lengthened, as was the size as we moved into double editions in an attempt to catch up. Other things were happening. More people were reading it electronically, and our email notification list grew substantially, becoming quite international. In recent years Tim Beal’s commentary has been republished elsewhere, most nota= bly in the prestigious Japan Focus = (as is this one). That in turn often led to reproduction in other websites. Publication in journals such as Japan Focus required a longer and = more academic treatment of complex issues, and references. All this took us away from the ori= ginal structure and format.

This latest edition does away with = the two columns of the past, and goes for a simpler layout. We are no longer so concerned about length. We give only the open= ing paragraph of the commentary, to a link for the rest.   The eclectic collection of snippets from the media is the same as before. Readers of the web version get a l= ink to the original article.

We hope our readers find the new Pyongyang Report an improvement on= the old, or certainly no worse. We do not know how long we will be able to keep this up; getting to the twentieth year seems unlikely. As always, we welcome any support, financial or otherwise, that will help us keep producing the newsletter. In particular, we are on the looko= ut for successors, so if you are younger than us, which isn’t difficult, and would like to get involved, please let us know.

Finally a thanks to Stephen Epstein= whose critical scrutiny has not only engaged us in productive debate, but saved us from many a typo over the years.

Tim Beal and Don Borrie

Commentary=

On the brink

Prospects for US-DPRK settlement dim, yet again

Tim Beal

Every time it looks as if US-DPRK n= egotiations are on the verge of a breakthrough someone in Washington throws a spanner in the works. This is what happened = in 2005 as the Chinese were forcing through the Joint Statement of 19 September which seemed to put the negotiations, under the aegis of the Six Party Talk= s, on a course for a successful resolution. The US Treasury designated the Macau bank used by North K= orean entities (and British companies and joint ventures in DPRK), Banco Delta Asia, as a “Primary Money Launderi= ng Concern under USA PATRIOT Act”. Although the allegations were subsequently discredited, partly through the investigative reporting of the US chain McClatchy Newspapers, the action put the Six Party Talks in limbo for over a year, as well as having a serious impact on DPRK foreign trade, and hence on the economy itself, which reportedly shrank 1.1% in 2006. Negotiat= ions between US Under Secretary of State Christopher Hill and DPRK Vice Minister= Kim Kye-gwan resulted in a couple of agreements in 2007, one in February the other in October, which seemed to offer a way forward. These h= opes have been dashed and prospects at the moment look dim.

Full version of this commentary ava= ilable at Japan Focus

If you do not have access to the we= b, and live in New Zealand, a printout can be obtained from Rev Don Borrie, 7 Thornley St.= , Titahi Bay, Porirua, NZ

Tel/fax: +64 4 236 6422; Email: dborrie@ihug.co.nz

News reports

US-DPRK negotiations = and the curious Syrian affair

DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Issue of Implementation of October 3 Agreemen= t

&n= bsp; Pyongyang, January 4 (KCNA) -- A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK releas= ed the following statement Friday as regards the delay in the implementation of the October 3 agreement made at the six-party talks:

    It is beyond Dec. 31, = 2007, the deadline set in the Oct. 3 agreement.

    It is regrettable that points agreed there remain unimplemented except the disablement of the DPRK= 's nuclear facilities.

    The disablement started early in November last year and all the operations were completed within the "technologically possible scope" as of Dec. 31.

    At present, the unload= ing of spent fuel rods scheduled to be completed in about 100 days is underway as = the last process.

    However, the delivery = of heavy fuel oil and energy-related equipment and materials to the DPRK, commitments of other participating nations, has not been done even 50 per c= ent.

    The schedule for the m= onthly delivery of heavy fuel oil as well as the delivery of energy-related equipm= ent and materials and relevant technical processes are being steadily delayed. =

    The U.S. ha= s not honored its commitments to cross the DPRK off the list of "sponsors of terrorism" and stop applying the "Trading with the Enemy Act" against it.

    Looking back on what h= as been done, one may say that the DPRK is going ahead of others in fulfilling= its commitment.

    As far as the nuclear declaration on which wrong opinion is being built up by some quarters is concerned, the DPRK has done what it should do. ..//..

Source: KCNA, Pyong= yang, 4 January 2008

http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2008/200= 801/news01/05.htm#1

U.S. Sees Stalling by = North Korea on Nuclear Pact

By HELENE COOPER

Published: January 19, 2008<= /p>
WASHINGTON — A debate is under way within the Bush administration = over how long it can exercise patience with North Korea without jeopardiz= ing the fulfillment of a nuclear agreement that President Bush has claimed as a foreign policy victory.

With North Korea sending signals that it may be trying to wait o= ut Mr. Bush’s time in office before making any more concessions, administration officials are grappling with how the = United States should react. <= /span>

The debate has fractured along fami= liar lines, with a handful of national security hawks in Vice President Dick Cheney’s office and at the State Department arguing for a more confrontational approach with = Pyongyang.

On the other side, Mr. Bush’s= lead North Korea nuclear negotiator, Christophe= r R. Hill, has argued that the United States should continue a more restrained approach, one that is widely credited with bringing about an agreement last year that is intended eventually to lead to the denuclearization of the Kor= ean peninsula.

While the restrained stance still a= ppears to have support from Mr. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, it is coming under fire from conservative critics, both in and out of the administration.

In a public departure from administ= ration policy, Jay Lefkowitz, a conservative lawyer who is Mr. Bush’s envoy = on North Korean human rights, said this week the North would likely “rem= ain in its present nuclear status” when the next president took over in January 2009.

“North Korea is not serious ab= out disarming in a timely manner,” Mr. Lefkowitz told an audience at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank. “We should consider a new approach to North Korea.”..//..

Source: New York Times, 19 January 2008

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/19/wash= ington/19korea.html?ex=3D1358485200&en=3D58c9338e2f30a1b4&ei=3D5124= &partner=3Dpermalink&exprod=3Dpermalink

Rice Rebukes Bush Envoy Who Criticized Policy on North Korea

By HELENE COOPER

Published: January 23, 2008<= /p>
WASHINGTON — Secretary of Sta= te Condoleezza Rice, in a rare public rebuke, has upbraided a White House envoy who criticized United States diplomacy toward North Korea that is aimed at coaxing the North Koreans to give up their nuclear weapons.

Ms. Rice said the official, Jay Lef= kowitz, President Bush’s special envoy on North Korean human rights, was not speaking for the administration when he told an audience at the American Enterprise Institute last week that the United States “should conside= r a new approach to North Korea” because the current approach was unlikel= y to resolve the issue before the end of Mr. Bush’s term in a year.

Speaking to reporters aboard her fl= ight to Berlin on Monday, Ms. Rice sharply disagreed, and s= aid Mr. Lefkowitz should stick to human rights and leave the talks over the North’s nuclear policy to her, Mr. Bush and the other nations involve= d: Russia, Ch= ina, Japan and South Korea.

“He’s the human rights envoy,” Ms. Rice said. “That’s what he knows. That’s what he does. He doesn’t work on the six-party talks. He doesn’t know what’s going on in the six-party talks and he certainly has no s= ay in what American policy will be in the six-party talks.”…//..

Source: New York Times, 23 January 2008

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/wash= ington/23korea.html?ex=3D1358830800&en=3Daee8aa91cc671ca1&ei=3D5124= &partner=3Dpermalink&exprod=3Dpermalink

Slowly, but Surely, Pyongyang Is Moving

By David Albright and Jacqueline Sh= ire

Thursday, January 24, 2008; Page A1= 9

The optimism with which the October agreement with North= Korea was welcomed has faded amid accusations that the North again is not keeping= its commitments. First came word that "disablement" of nuclear facili= ties was slowing. Then there was the missed Dec. 31 deadline for North Korea to declare the fu= ll scope of its nuclear program, including its plutonium stockpile and uranium enrichment activities. And earlier in the fall, North Korea was accused of helping <= st1:country-region w:st=3D"on">Syria construct a nuclear fac= ility in its desert, reportedly a reactor.

The finger-wagging, told-you-so nay= sayers in and out of the Bush administration should take a deep breath. There is no indication that North Korea is backing away from its commitments to disable= key nuclear facilities and every reason to expect this process to unfold slowly, with North Korea taking small, incremental steps in return for corresponding steps from the United States and others in the six-party discussions.

Disablement of the five-megawatt re= actor at Yongbyon slowed in part because the United = States decided that unloading the irradiated fuel rods as fast as North Korea proposed could needlessly risk exposing the North Korean workers to excessive radiation. <= st1:place w:st=3D"on">North Korea is unloading the rods and making steady progress on the other aspects of disablement at the Yongbyon site. Could it be happening faster? Probably, a= nd North Korea would point out that promised shipments of heavy fuel oil are also slow in coming.

North Korea's nuclear declaration was to be received by Dec. 31. On Jan. = 2, White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said the United States was still "waiting to hear" from the North. Pyongyang= responded that the U= nited States had its declaration. After some tail-chasing, it emerged that North Korea had quietly shared an initial declaration with the <= st1:country-region w:st=3D"on">United States in November. According to media reports, this declaration stated that North Korea had a separated plutonium stockpile of 30 kilograms and denied that it had a uranium enrich= ment program. ..//..

Does this quantity of separated plu= tonium make sense? Yes. ..//..

What about any enriched uranium? ..= //.. But we should not lose sight of an uncomfortable fact -- that U.S. policymakers misread (at best) or hyp= ed information that Nor= th Korea had a large-scale uranium enrichment program. There is ample evidence that = North Korea acquired components for a centrifuge-enrichment program, but few now believe the North produced highly enriched uranium or developed its enrichment capabilities in the manner once claimed by the Unite= d States.

The success or failure of this late= st agreement with North= Korea must not hinge on the uranium issue. This is an interesting and relevant pa= rt of its nuclear program, but it is still a footnote in the context of its plutonium production. ..//..

Nor= th Korea is looking to the United States to keep its promises on delisting= it as a terrorist state. Unfortunately, given the climate in Washington and the perception that North Korea is slow-rolling the declaration process, this is unlikely over the near term. Pyongyang should be realistic in its expectations. ..//..

David Albright, a former U.N. weapo= ns inspector, is president of the Institute for Science and International Security. Jacqueline Shire is a senior analyst at ISIS and a former State Department foreign affairs officer.

Source: Washington Post, 24 January, 2008

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/c= ontent/article/2008/01/23/AR2008012303282.html?hpid=3Dopinionsbox1

What A.Q. Khan Knows

How Pakistan's Proliferator Could Help in Pyongyang

By Selig S. Harrison

Thursday, January 31, 2008; Page A2= 1

Either Kim Jong Il or Pervez Mushar= raf is lying about whether Pakistan's Dr. Strangelove, Abdul Qadeer Khan, gave centrifuges to North Korea for uranium enric= hment. Unless the truth can be established, the hitherto-promising denuclearization negotiations with Pyongyang are likely to collapse.

Khan has been shielded from foreign interrogators since his arrest three years ago for running a global nuclear Wal-Mart. Musharraf wrote in his memoir, "In the Line of Fire," t= hat the former czar of Pakistan's nuclear program provided "nearly two dozen" prototype centrifuges suitable for uranium enrichment experimen= ts to North Korea -- a charge flatly denied by Pyongyang.

"Why don't you invite A.Q. Kha= n to join the negotiations?" North Korea's U.N. representative, Kim Myong G= il, asked with a broad smile over lunch recently. "Where is the invoice? G= ive us the evidence." ..//..

Why is Musharraf determined to keep= Khan under wraps?

The official answer in Islamabad is that Pakistan's sovereignty would be affronted by letting U.S. intelligence agents cross-examine him. Khan is regarded as a national hero, and the United States is widely hated in Pakistan for invading Iraq and Afghanistan and for its insensitivity to civilian casualties. ..//..

Many Pakistanis say Musharraf is stonewalling because he and some of his army generals collaborated with Khan and fear exposure. Another possible explanation is that the documentary evi= dence does not exist. Still another is that Musharraf changed his position on the centrifuges and invented the "facts" in his memoir to curry favor with the Bush administration; by strengthening its case against North Korea, in this view, he hoped to off= set dissatisfaction in Washington with his ineffectual performance in combating al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

This explanation cannot be dismisse= d, since in a February 2004 New York Times interview Musharraf "emphatically denied" U.S. repo= rts of Pakistani nuclear technology transfers to Pyongyang. ..//..

Selig S. Harrison, director of the = Asia program at the Center for International Policy, has visited North Korea 10 times and is the author of "Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunificati= on and U.S. Disengagement." He has covered Pakistan since 1951, includin= g for The Post.

Source: Washington Post, 31 January 2008

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/c= ontent/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013003214.html

US envoy suggests sp= lit over N Korea

By Daniel Dombey in Washington

Published: February 6 2008 22:06

The US administration is divided over whether its attempt to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons= is paying off, Christopher Hill, the US official responsible for negotiations with Pyongyang, suggested on Wednesday.

But in testimony before the Senate,= Mr Hill issued a stout defence of the six party talks that seek to convince North Korea to denuclearise, despite missed deadlines in recent weeks.

The Bush administration had hoped f= or a breakthrough on North Korea to cap its foreign policy record in its final year in office but the pace of progress has become a hot topic in Washington. North Korea has failed= to provide a complete declaration of its nuclear activities to the US’s satisfaction, despite a December 31 deadline, and has also slowed down work “disabling” its Yongbyon reactor, which has produced plutonium = for its nuclear bombs.

While acknowledging the other major= parts of disablement had been completed, Mr Hill said shifts at Yongbyon to remove spent fuel rods had come down from three a day to one. He linked this to a dispute over fuel oil, noting the US and other countries have s= o far delivered only a fifth of the 1m tons promised…//..

Source: Financial Times, London, 6 February 2008

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/98fb0ea6-d4f= e-11dc-9af1-0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid=3D319b98a6-0c1a-11db-86c7-0000779e2340.ht= ml

North Korea Says Aid Holds Up Disarmament Deal

By REUTERS

Published: February 16, 2008=

BEIJING (Reuters) - North Korea appears committed to a nuclear disarmament deal but remains unwilling to complete two big steps until complaints over aid and U.S. concessions are solved, U.S. experts just back from North Korea said on Saturday.

Under disarmament terms announced in October last year, North Korea was offered 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil= or equivalent aid, and the United States agreed to move to take the North from= a sanctions list aimed at sponsors of terrorism.

In return, <= st1:country-region w:st=3D"on">North Korea agreed to "disable" its Yongbyon nuclear facility and fully declare all nuc= lear activities by the end of 2007.

But those two steps have stalled af= ter North Korean complaints that the energy aid and U.S. concessions were not com= ing soon enough.

North Korean officials appeared wil= ling to proceed with disarmament steps, but only after their own demands were met, = said Siegfried Hecker, a Stanford University researcher who went to the North wit= h two other U.S. experts on a non-government trip…//..

But he and Joel Wit, a former U.S. = State Department official who has long dealt with the isolated communist state, s= aid they were struck by North Korea's candor and cooperation with U.S. disarmament technicians at Yongbyon.

"The level of cooperation was extremely good, better than I've ever seen in the ten years that I have been visiting that facility," Wit said. ..//..

Source: New York Times, 16 February 2008

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/i= nternational-korea-north-nuclear.html?scp=3D2&sq=3Dnorth+korea&st= =3Dnyt

North rejects U.S. offer as hopes for talks fade

By Kang Chan-ho

March 21, 2008

WASHINGTON North Korea continued to insist during tal= ks in Geneva last week that it doesn’t have any high= ly enriched uranium and that it didn’t export any nuclear materials to <= st1:place w:st=3D"on">Syria, according to several sources in Washington who declined to be named.

Christopher Hill, Washington’s special envoy to the nuclear talks, suggested to his North Korean counterpa= rt, Kim Gye-gwan, that N= orth Korea confidentially declare its highly enriched uranium program, the sources said, while openly declaring less controversial issues such as its level of plutonium.

But Kim refused to do so, the sourc= es said.

“We did not have, we don̵= 7;t have and we will not have [them],” Kim told reporters in Geneva last week, referring to the alleged secret uranium enrichment program and connections to a nuclear program in Syria. ..//..

Source: Joon= gAng Ilbo, Seoul, 21 March 2008

http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article= /view.asp?aid=3D2887687

DPRK Foreign Ministry's Spokesman Blasts U.S. Delaying Tactics in Solu= tion of Nuclear Issue

   Pyongyang, March = 28 (KCNA) -- A spokesman for the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs released the following statement Friday blaming the U.S. for the deadlocked implementati= on of the October 3 agreement of the six-party talks:

    The implementati= on of the October 3 agreement of the six-party talks is at a deadlock due to the behavior of the U.S.=

    The U.S. has not fulfilled its commitments as regards the lifting of the sanctions within the agreed period but insisted on its unreasonable demands concerning the nuclear declaration, thus throwing hurdles in the way of settling the issue.

    As clarified in = the statement issued by the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 4, the DPRK worked out a report on the nuclear declaration and info= rmed the U.S. side of this in November last year. And when the U.S. proposed to have a furth= er discussion on the content of the report with the DPRK, the latter has shown= so far such magnanimity as responding to such negotiations.

    Simple is the re= ason why the DPRK responded to the negotiations on the issue of the nuclear declarat= ion.

    The Bush adminis= tration was so absurd as to raise the issue of "suspected uranium enrichment&q= uot; in 2002, scuttling the DPRK-U.S. dialogue and straining the situation to an extreme pitch of tension. This pushed the DPRK to its access to nuclear wea= pons in the end.

    The DPRK rendered necessary sincere help in clarifying the issue raised by the U.S. side, taking into consideration the face of the Bush administration which was to blame for the former's access to nuclear weapons.

    When the U.S. side claimed that the issue of "suspected uranium enrichment" can be solved if the DPRK tells ab= out whereabouts of the imported aluminum tubes, the DPRK took such a measure as= an exception as allowing U.S. experts to see even sensitive military objects and providing them with samp= les. ..//..

    Explicitly speak= ing, the DPRK has never enriched uranium nor rendered nuclear cooperation to any oth= er country. It has never dreamed of such things.

    Such things will= not happen in the future, too.

    Should the U.S. = delay the settlement of the nuclear issue, persistently trying to cook up fiction= s, it will seriously affect the disabling of nuclear facilities which has been under way so far with a great deal of effort.

Source: KCNA, Pyong= yang, 28 March 2008

http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2008/200803= /news03/29.htm#1

Interview With the Associated Press

Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs<= /span>

Jakarta, Indonesia

April 4, 2008..//..

QUESTION: Talk to us more generally= . The United States also has nuclear weapons. Has that been ever brought up in your talks? Does= it make it hard for you to argue that North Ko= rea and Iran can’t h= ave nuclear weapons while the United States has so many?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I m= ean -- Frankly, you cannot begin to talk about the differences in the history and = the country. So, no, in answer to you, it does not come up. What does come up f= rom time as the North Koreans say, “Well, country X has nuclear weapons, = why can’t we?” Well, the fact is, if you look at you look at Northe= ast Asia, if you look at the Korean = Peninsula, you can pretty quickly -- I think wi= thin a few seconds, frankly -- understand why it’s very dangerous, very destabilizing for No= rth Korea to be holding on the nuclear weapo= ns. So, what of the thinking that country X or country Y or country Z has nucle= ar weapons, and why can’t they? The fact of the matter is, it’s ve= ry destabilizing, and frankly it is hurting North Korea profoundly. And I= hope that they will come to understand that and give this thing up and get on wi= th life.

QUESTION: But the United States would never giv= e up theirs. Why is that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I t= hink it’s a broad question. But the whole issue of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the role of a nuclear states under Article VI to begin a process= of reducing arsenals, this is something we actually worked on with the Soviet Union and then with the Russians. So, you know, there has been some build-d= own in arsenals, and I am sure in the future as we continue to work with other nuclear states, there’ll also be build-down.

But I would really caution you in t= hinking this is somehow related to the fact that we have a country, North Korea, that has a myria= d of problems and yet here they are trying to develop nuclear weapons

QUESTION: Let’s talk about ri= sing rice prices here in East Asia. …//= ..

Source: State Departm= ent, Washington, 4 April 2008

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2008/04/102967.htm

Progress Cited in = Korea Nuclear Talks Impasse

By Choe Sang-Hun

April 9, 2008

SEOUL<= /st1:City>, South Korea — North Korea an= d the United States made significant progress on Tuesday toward ending an impasse in talks aime= d at revealing the full scale of the North’s nuclear weapons programs and dismantling them, top negotiators from both countries said. ..//..

Under a February 2007 agreement, North Korea agreed to give a complete accounting of its nuclear activities by the end of last year. It has said that it fulfilled its commitment last November. But = Washington insists that North Korea failed to clarify whether it had pursued a secr= et uranium-enrichment program in addition to its known weapons program based on plutonium and whether it has provided nuclear technology to countries like = Syria.

Nor= th Korea has repeatedly denied having a uranium-enrichment program or providing nuclear expertise or materials to Syria. But Mr. Hill has been = trying to get North Korea to = at least acknowledge such the validity of such suspicions, according to offici= als in Seoul, who spoke on the condition of anonymity given the delicacy of the talks.=

Source: New York Times, 9 April 2008

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/world/asia/09korea.html?ex=3D136548000= 0&en=3D9f7cd36c7f7ef5cd&ei=3D5124&partner=3Dpermalink&expro= d=3Dpermalink

U.S.<= /st1:country-region>, N.Korea ‘Agree’ on Nuke Declaration

The U.S. and North Korea on Tuesday reached tentative agreement on the declaration of the North's nuclear programs, an issue that has been shelved for more than three months. The top nuclear negotiators of the two countries were meeting in Singapore<= /st1:place>. ..//..

In their meeting, the two sides rep= ortedly agreed on wording in the declaration, which will not be released to the pub= lic, regarding suspicions about the North's uranium enrichment program and trans= fer of nuclear technology to Syria. A diplomatic source said, "The wording in the declaration will probably persuade the U.S. Congress." ..//..

Source: Chosun Ilbo, Seoul, 9 April 2008

http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html= /news/200804/200804090003.html

Republicans hit at US deal with N Korea <= /span>

By Demetri Sevastopulo and Daniel D= ombey in Washington

Tuesday Apr 15 2008 19:40

Senior Republicans on Tuesday criti= cised a tentative US deal with North Korea that would allow Pyongyang to avoid revealing the full extent of its nuclear programmes as part o= f a broader agreement towards denuclearising the Korean peninsula.

Christopher Hill, the senior US env= oy on North Korea, last week briefed the House on a deal that would see North Kor= ea "acknowledge", in a secret document, US allegations about nuclear proliferation to Syria and a possible rudimentary uranium-enrichment progra= mme.

Under the deal, still being finalis= ed, North Korea would provide a full declaration of only its plutonium programme, which produced the nuclear weapon it tested in 2006.

Critics have accused the administra= tion of backtracking on previous assurances that Pyongyang would have to reveal the full extent of its past nuclear activities to comp= lete the second stage of the six-party agreement that would also result in the lifting of US sanctions…//..

Gordon Flake, a Korean expert and e= xecutive director of the Mansfield Foundation, said that while the original framework for the deal was "solid", the latest arrangement "turns the whole idea of a declaration on its head" because instead of providing a full declaration, No= rth Korea would simply "acknowledge&quo= t; US allegations.

One congressional aide who supports negotiations with No= rth Korea said House members were "underwhelmed" by the briefing they had received from Mr Hill.

He said the agreement reached with = Pyongyang "ap= peared to allow the North Koreans to evade the obligation to provide the complete and accurate declaration".

He added that Congress was likely t= o become more involved in the debate as the next stage of the so-called six-party process would require congressional action, including providing a waiver to= the Glenn amendment, which would prohibit the US from providing assistance to N= orth Korea because it had tested a nuclear bomb two years ago

Source: Financial Times, 15 April 2008

http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.f= t?news_id=3Dfto041520082049339021

IAEA to probe Syria atomic plant report

Mark Heinrich , Reuters

Published: Friday, April 25, 2008

VIENNA= - The U.N. nuclear watchdog pledged on Friday to investigate whether Syria secretly= built an atomic reactor with North Korean help but criticised the United States for delaying the release of intelligence.

The United States revealed its intelligence material on Thursday about the suspected Syrian atomic plant, saying it was "nearing operational capability" a month before Isr= aeli warplanes bombed it on Sept. 6.

Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, lambasted Israel for the air strike, sa= ying his inspectors should have been able to verify beforehand whether undeclared nuclear activity had been going on.

In light of (this, I) view the unil= ateral use of force by Isra= el as undermining the due process of verification that is at the heart of the non-proliferation regime," he said. ..//..

A diplomat close to the Vienna-base= d agency expressed anger at the delay. "There is a lot of annoyance here about = the lateness in the day that the IAEA got this information. Had this been given= to the IAEA before this damn bombing, then the world might know the true story," the diplomat said.

"Even right after the bombing,= before the place was totally cleaned up, it would have been easier." ..//..

The diplomat and analysts said the = U.S. di= sclosure did not amount to proof of an illicit nuclear arms programme since there wa= s no sign of a reprocessing plant needed to convert spent fuel from the plant in= to bomb-grade plutonium.

"The absence of such facilitie= s gives little confidence that the reactor was part of an active nuclear weapons programme," David Albright and Paul Brannan of the Institute for Scien= ce and International Security said in an email commentary. ..//..

Syr= ia likens the U.S. allegations to those made against Iraq about weapons of mass de= struction that were never found. It accused the United States of colluding in Israel's air strike. <= /p>

"The U.S. administration was appar= ently party to the execution" of the air raid, a Syrian government statement said, without giving details. A U.S. official said Washington did not give Israel any "green light" to strike the area. ..//..

Source: Reuters in Canada.com, 25 April 2008

http://www.canada.com/topics/news/worl= d/story.html?id=3D019bbf14-96b0-42ed-aefb-d5d2e073db9b&k=3D13268=

FAQ: What did Israel bomb?

The Guardian, Friday April 25 2008 =

Do the new US pictures prove Syria= was building a nuclear reactor?

Not definitively. The new pictures = do strengthen the impression that a reactor was being built before the Israeli= air raid last September, but there remain questions about the provenance of the pictures and the timing of their publication, with the experience of Iraq in mind. Analysts at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nucle= ar watchdog, question why there is no sign of security measures around the sit= e, and say the building does not seem high enough for a reactor…//..

Is there anything significant about= the timing of the release of the new pictures?

Yes, it comes at a very sensitive m= oment in negotiations over the North Korean nuclear programme, which could take Pyongyang off the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. Some analysts have suggested the release of the pictures could b= e an attempt by Washington hawks led by Dick Cheney to derail that deal.

Source: The Guardian, London, 25 April 2008

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/a= pr/25/israelandthepalestinians.usa

Skepticism toward Bush claims about Syria and North Korea

Many media accounts simply repeat uncritically the rather dubious accusations of the administration. <= /p>
Glenn Greenwald

Apr. 25, 2008

There are multiple reasons why subs= tantial skepticism is warranted concerning the Bush administration's claims that the structure which Israeli jets destroyed inside Syria last September was a nuclear reactor Syria was developing with the aid of North Korea. Such skepticism, however, is difficult to find in most (though not all) American press accounts, which do little other than repeat Government claims without challenge. ..//..

Beyond the lack of evidence support= ing the Israeli and American claims that "Syria was close to completing= the physical reactor," there are multiple other reasons for skepticism. Th= is article by David Sanger in The New York Times references several of them, including the fact that "senior intelligence officials acknowledged th= at the evidence had left them with no more than 'low confidence' that Syria was preparing to build a nuclear weapon" and some of the photographs in the video presentation 'seemed to go back to before 2002.'"

There are all sorts of reasons beyo= nd those for extreme skepticism here. After flamboyantly announcing that they had ac= tual video of North Korean nuclear scientists inside the Syrian building, it tur= ned out that the "video" was merely a compilation of rather unreveali= ng still photographs patched together, in Colin-Powell-at-the-UN fashion, with ominous narration making accusations with a level of certainty completely unmatched by the "evidence" itself. The one "smoking gun&quo= t; photograph from the video -- the alleged North Korean head of that country's reactor fuel plant standing in Syria (in a sweat suit) posing next to the h= ead of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission -- seems to raise more questions tha= n it resolves:

If two countries are engaged in a h= ighly covert and nefarious program to build nuclear weapons, are their leading nuclear officials really going to pose together outdoors for a smiling, cas= ual, tourist-like photograph? At the very least, that photograph -- touted as the most direct evidence -- hardly constitutes compelling or even minimally con= vincing evidence of the administration's accusations. To the contrary, the whole episode reminds one of Howard Dean's prescient reaction to the Colin Powell U.N. slideshow, which Dean delivered in a speech on Febraury 17, 2003 at Drake University:

Secretary Powell's recent presentat= ion at the UN showed the extent to which we have Iraq under an audio and visual microscope. Given that, I was impressed not by the vastness of evidence presented by the Secretary, but rather by its sketchiness…//..=

Source: Salon.com, 25 April 2008

http://archive.salon.com/opinion/green= wald/2008/04/25/syria/print.html

The curious Syrian nuclear affair

Financial Times editorial

Just over five years ago, a US secr= etary of state, Colin Powell, made more than two dozen claims to the United Nations Security Council about Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction. In the build-up to war, many found it a compelling performance= . But all Mr Powell’s assertions were subsequently shown to be without foundation. He might as well have shown the world a video game.

Not long after that, Israel started hawking “evidenceR= 21; uncovered by its spies that Saddam Hussein had moved his WMD to Syria. It got some takers – but nothing more has been heard of this chimera.=

Thursday’s Central Intelligen= ce Agency presentation to the US Congress – making the case that North K= orea supplied Syria with a nuclear reactor able to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons – was also compelling. It would also appear to justify retroactively the Israeli air strike on the site in = Syria’s eastern desert = last September. But given the US and Israel’s recent record in these matters, it could also be just another dog and pony show.

Taken purely on its own terms, the = US claim raises many questions. Where was Damascus going to get the fissile fuel for this alleged reactor? Where was the pluto= nium separator, or reprocessing facility for spent fuel? Where is the evidence f= or a weaponisation programme? Why, moreover, did the US (and Israeli air force) by= pass the IAEA, the UN’s nuclear watchdog?..//..

This affair is very odd. The CIA= 217;s decision to go public now backs Pyongyang = into a corner at a critical moment in the six-power talks on North Korea’s nuclear disarmament – leading some to detect the hand of Bush administration hawks such as Dick Cheney…//..

Source: Financial Times, London, 25 April 2008

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/731b1f0e-130= 7-11dd-8d91-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=3D1

North K= orea and the Chimera in the Syrian Desert

Gavan McCormack

Did the month of April bring us nearer to the so-much desired grand bargain settlement on North = Korea? The Singapore agreement between the US and North Korea on 8 April seemed to= do so, resolving the key plutonium issue so that North Korea would disable its Yongbyon reactor and seal its plutonium wastes in preparation to handing th= em over, and establishing broad agreement on the size of those stocks (for Nor= th Korea, 30 kgs, which it has expressed readiness to prove by opening its records, and for the US, "between 30 and 40 kgs"). On the other issues - uranium enrichment and proliferation - North Korea would admit nothing, but the US would state its "concerns" an= d North Korea acknowledge them. This "declaration" process would complete the second phase of the Beijing agreement and open the path to the third and final stage - the grand penins= ula settlement. The State Department mission to Pyongyang that followed was assumed to = be working on the fine detail, bringing the two countries to the brink of reconciliation, and therefore offering the prospect of relief for the poor = and hungry citizens of the North.

Suddenly on 24 April, however, the White House intervened to pour cold water on such hopes, accusing North Korea of nuclear proliferation by aiding Syria to construct a graphite-moderated nuclear reactor with a probable weapons purpose. = ..//..

For the Syrian proliferation issue to have been raised as it was late in April, just as other issues were resolved and with North Korea on the brink of com= ing in from the cold, was to repeat the common pattern of the Bush administrati= on: that the bar be raised whenever a solution seemed imminent. South Korea's president, Lee Myung Bak, ho= sted by President Bush at Camp David just on the eve of this latest policy switc= h, must be presumed to have known of the US shift, whether or not he actively encouraged it.

The beleaguered Bush administration seemed to be either reverting to earlier "regime change" policies or possibly seeking a face-saving, diplomatic cover to allow it to claim a diplomatic triumph in East Asia to = make up for the disasters elsewhere. After years of futile attempts to pin responsibility on North Korea for multiple crimes and breaches, the proliferation card, strongly urged by= Israel, may have seemed the best card left. ..//..=

Gavan McCormack is an emeritus professor of Australian National University= , a coordinator of Japan Focus, a= nd author of the just published Client State: Japan in the American Embrace

Source: Kyunghyang Shinmun, Seoul, 6 May 2008

http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_ar= t_view.html?artid=3D200805051800035&code=3D990309

Other news

The N.Y. Philharmonic in North Korea: Symbology and the Music

By Anne Midgette

Washington Post Staff Writer

Tuesday, February 26, 2008; Page C0= 4

Today, the New York Philharmonic is= playing a concert in Pyongyang, North Korea. This is an unprecedented event, and the media are making sure that the world knows it.= In the weeks since the impending concert was announced in December, we have be= en treated to the spectacle of music pundits enjoying a chance to sound off on politic= s, with indignant authority, strong opinions and very little actual knowledge.=

On one side of the debate are those= who aver that the New York Philharmonic should not be dignifying the Kim Jong Il administration with its presence. The other side maintains that this North Korea performance, which will be broadcast nationally on North Korean television and in this country by PBS, is an act of cultural diplomacy, pro= ving that music is a universal language with the ability to spread peace and har= mony (think Leonard Bernstein going to Moscow with the Philharmonic in 1959).

The problem with this argument is t= hat it partakes of the idea that we, the noble West, are going to bring the good things of classical music to the benighted North Koreans. This attitude is = all too familiar in classical music in general: It is the same well-meaning approach that gives so many outreach programs their tinge of benevolent didacticism, the tone of a conductor speaking cheerfully on a podium to edu= cate his or her audience.

And another problem with this argum= ent is that, like many opinions, it is not informed by facts. For there is evidence that North Korea does actually have a considerable music life.

"In the State Symphony of Nort= h Korea, they do Tchaikovsky from memory," says Suzannah Clarke, a British opera singer who has performed frequently in North Korea. She adds, "= The Philharmonic could probably learn a thing or two." ..//..

Asia<= /st1:place> is a hotbed of Western classical music. This passion has evid= ently not bypassed North K= orea. Much of the West harbors images of North Koreans as either wealthy soldiers= or starving peasants. But in Vien= na, Austria, = there is another image of them: as conducting students. The elite conducting clas= s at the University of Music and Performin= g Arts there has trained no fewer than 17 North Korean students in the past decade. ..//..

"The next batch," Stringe= r said, "knew what to expect. They were so prepared they could nail every sing= le bit of our ferociously difficult entrance exam."

The students also do not fulfill an= yone's expectations of politically guarded wards of the state. "They have a completely normal experience," Stringer says. "Once they're in the walls of the school, politics disappear. There is no breathing down our nec= ks from the North Korean officials." He describes the students as general= ly more open, easygoing and funny than their South Korean counterparts.

"Were they to be allowed to st= ay in the West," he says, "a number of the ones I've seen would have a serious chance of a prominent international career. It's phenomenal what th= ey come to Vienna knowing how to do."

This is not a picture of North Korea that anybody in the United States, even the music press, tends to espouse. Nor would many pundits imagine the scene Stringer describes when North and South Korean students presented a j= oint concert of their music in December 2006, and both ambassadors were invited. Prepared for tension and hostility, the organizers were shocked when the ambassadors chatted happily together, walked companionably to the reception with their wives, and continued their lively conversation over glasses of b= eer. ..//..

Source: Washington Post, 26 February 2008

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/c= ontent/article/2008/02/25/AR2008022502621.html

'34 Percent of Army Cadets Regard US as Main Enemy'

By Kim Yon-se

Staff Reporter

A poll shows that 34 percent of fir= st-year army cadets called the United States the main enemy of So= uth Korea, a former superintendent of the Ko= rea Military Academy (KMA) said.

Kim Choong-bae, president of the Ko= rea Institute for Defense Analyses, disclosed a past survey of 250 KMA entrants= to single out "the country's main enemy'' while serving as the military academy's superintendent in 2004.

Kim was quoted by a newspaper as sa= ying, "While the majority ? or 34 percent ? picked the U.S., 33 percent said they regarded North Korea as the main enemy.''

He said the result was unbelievable, stressing the respondents were those who were supposed to be military offic= ers. The KMA did not make the result public during the Roh Moo-hyun administrati= on, which ended last February…//..

Kim hinted that he had been forced = not to notify the public of the result, expressing uneasiness about contents of so= me high and middle schools textbooks.

Citing his meeting with the 250 cad= et freshmen, the military expert argued that the hostile sentiment against the "ally" is due to "inappropriate'' education in schools.

In addition, according to a survey = of a group of conscripted soldiers conducted by the Ministry of Defense, about 75 percent of them said they have anti-U.S. sentiment.

Various polls on college students or elementary school students have shown that major enemies of South Korea include North Korea, Japan and the U.S.

Meanwhile, North Korea had been found to label the U.S. and Japan as its main enemies. Th= ere has been no document or official commentaries from Py= ongyang which describe South= Korea as the main enemy of the North.

Nor= th Korea had reportedly defined the U.= S. a "mortal enemy'' and Japan a "longstanding enemy,'' some military officials said.

Source: Korea Times, Seoul, 6 April 2008

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/n= ation/2008/04/116_22029.html

Nosotek: First European software firm based in DPRK

“Nosotek is the first Europea= n-invested software development & research company in the DPRK, with the head offi= ce in Pyongyang.” - Interview with Mr. Ju Jong Chol (Vice-President of Nosotek)

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Mr. Ju, you are= the Vice President of a very interesting company named Nosotek (www.nosotek.com= ). Could you please tell us something about this venture?

Ju Jong Chol: Nosotek is the first European-invested software development & research company in the DPRK, = with the head office in Pyongyang.

It is founded by the General Federa= tion of Science and Technology (GFST) of DPRK and experienced European IT-entrepreneurs. Felix Abt, the president of the European Business Associa= tion (www.eba-pyongyang.org) is one of Nosotek’s directors.

Nosotek is jointly run by European = IT engineers together with their Korean counterparts. We have presently 50 engineers and a strong production line. We expect rapid growth thanks to our qualified, experienced and committed staff.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: What are Nosotek’s main products?

Ju Jong Chol: As we specialize on o= ffshore IT outsourcing services we already have produced a large range of software products. Among our finished products, you find scientific software, video games, web applications, embedded software and 3D virtualization tools.

In case our customer needs a field = of service where we don’t have experienced engineers in our own staff, t= he GFST will help us finding good people among the scientists of the universit= ies. We can rely on sustainable DPRK and European engineering and business ressoucces.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: The DPRK is not= the Silicon Valley or Bangalore. What are the customer’s benefits to do Business with Nosotek?<= /p>

Ju Jong Chol: Of course, we’r= e not Silicon Valley or Bangalore. But we take the challenge to compete with these locations. The DPRK governm= ent took the strategic decision to give strong support to our IT industry which= now bears fruits.

In the DPRK, software engineers hav= e an average academic math level superior to their western or Indian counterpart= s.

Computer science education involves understanding of deep low level processes: when was the last time you hired= a PHP programmer to realize he was quite at ease in assembler?

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Outsourcing to = Asia is often identified with a risk of IP leak. Ma= ny western companies are complaining that after outsourcing their partners sta= rt copying their technology.

Ju Jong Chol: Then they are all inv= ited to do their outsourcing projects in the DPRK! Our country is well known to hav= e strong laws to protect secrets and we respect the value of IPs. And unlike what is common in other countries like China, there is only very little fluctuation of the workforce. Like in Japanese companies, our employees usually enter the company after university and stay their entire business life with the high personal motivation. This does not only help to keep trade secrets, it also helps to keep the experienced pers= ons, who are needed for long-term partnership…//..

Source: North Korea Economy Watch 20 A= pril 2008, reposted from http://www.interview-blog.de

http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2008/04/20/nosotek-first-= european-software-firm-based-in-dprk/

News from New Zealand=

NZ teacher returns to Pyongyang

Christchurch<= /span> based primary school teacher, Tim Kearns, is spending May in = Pyongyang teaching= in local schools and offering teacher training using NZ methodology.

This is the second time Tim has bee= n invited to share his expertise with Korean colleagues. While in Pyongyang Tim will = be discussing further possibilities for NZ teachers to spend professional time= in the DPRK.

DPRK scholars to study in NZ?

A DPRK senior scholars study progra= mme based with the Waikato Institute of Technology,(WINTEC) Hamilton, NZ, is currently under consideration by authorities both in the DPRK and NZ.

In late June a WINTEC officer, Rich= ard Lawrence, presently in China, is expected in Pyongyang, to advise on protocols and f= uture progress.

While in Pyongyang it is hoped that Richard will= also meet and discuss with the Korean Christian Federation the consolidation of friendly relations with the Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa NZ.

Joint study of migratory birds

Migratory birds whose international= flights include NZ , the DPRK and Ala= ska will be the subject of a Joint DPRK NZ ornithological study during the comi= ng year. It is hoped that a joint research group will be on site in the DPRK, = May, 2009 for the observation of transitory birds landing and departing on their epic flight.

Colloquium on DPRK-NZ relations

The NZ DPRK Society is presently negotiating with NZ Government authorities, and university based strategic policy groups with the intention of convening in 2009 a Track Two Colloquiu= m on current and future policy and relationships between the DPRK and NZ. It is hoped that special attention will be given to agriculture, education, econo= mic joint ventures and technology including IT.

NZ-DPRK Society urges emergency aid

The NZ DPRK Society is currently as= king the NZ Government to make further emergency food grants to NGOs ,including WFP,= in response to the food crisis in the DPRK.

Contributions invited

Persons wishing to contribute in ki= nd or cash to the work of the Society, its projects, including this newsletter, a= re invited to contact the Project Officer, Rev Stuart Vogel, 74 Parau St., Mt. Roskill, Auckland 1041. s.vogel@xtra.co.nz

=

Further information may be obtai= ned from: http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/dprk/

Dr Tim Beal

19 Devon Street, Kelburn Wellington, NZ

Tel: +64 4 463 5080 (day);+64 4 934 5= 133 (evening)

Fax: +64 4 934 5134; Email: Tim.Beal@vuw.ac.nz

Rev Don Borrie

7 Thornley St., Titahi Bay, Porirua, NZ<= /span>

Tel/fax: +64 4 236 6422

Email: dborrie@ihug.co.nz