Comment= ary

The Agreement signed at the Six Par= ty Talks in Beijing on 13 February was a bit of a surprise, but much less so than that caused by t= he Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. In 2005 there seemed to be no likelihood of a consensual acceptance = of the Chinese draft statement. However, according to the New York Times, China threatened to announce publicly that the US was isolated in its refusa= l to accede, and that threat, combined with the lack of intervention from Dick Cheney seems to have carried the day. However, the Joint Statement immediat= ely seized up, partly because both the DPRK and the US differed on their interpretation of the statement's deliberate ambiguities,= but mainly because the US applied pressure on the Banco Delta Asia [BDA] in Ma= cau to freeze its DPRK accounts on unsubstantiated accusations of money laundering. The amount involv= ed was small, only $24 million, but the impact on the DPRK was serious because of = the knock-on effect, with other banks being frightened to have commercial deali= ngs with the DPRK. Pyongyang withdrew from the Six Party Talks, saying it would not return until American financial sanctions were lifted.

Evidence suggests that the money la= undering affair was spurious. Certainly, the US actions were disproportion= ate to the amounts of money allegedly involved.&n= bsp; The BDA episode has turned out to be an embarrassment with companies such as Hyundai, with its tourism venture and the Kaesong Industrial Comple= x, and British American Tobacco, whic= h has a factory in DPRK, laying claim to a substantial part of the $24m. It is cl= ear from the timing that the financial sanctions were above all an attempt to derail the talks and in that they were successful for over a year; President Roh Moo-hyun noted that the BDA action ensured that the “September 19= ^th agreement was buried before it was born’. It was the tortuous, and essential= ly bilateral negotiations, between America and North Korea in China in October and December 2006, and th= en in Berlin in Januar= y 2007, which suggested that a tentative deal would be struck in February.

Other indications were present as well. The administration̵= 7;s setback in the mid-term elections led to the resignation of Rumsfeld and the withdrawal of Bolton from the UN. More telling, perhaps, than these casualties was the resignation of another lead= ing hardliner, Robert Joseph, in January. President Bush, in his State of the U= nion address made an emollient reference to ‘intensive diplomacy to achieve a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons’, a long cry from the vitriol of the Axis of = Evil speech in 2002.

Pyongyang had = stressed that it would not return to the talks until the financial sanctions were li= fted but in the event there was compromise and the talks were resumed, first in Dece= mber, and then in February, under a private understanding that they would be lift= ed under some face-saving mechanism by which the US would ‘wrap up its investigation’. It remains unclear whether the US will agree to the complete unfreezing of the accounts, or whether a partial unfreezing will satisfy the DPRK- probably not, because the effect on the DPRK’s access to the international financial system, rather than the amount itself, has been the issue. Moreover, there are doubts whether either action would lead to a resumption of dealings between banks and the DPRK, especially as = America has said that other banks may be investigated. As with the invasion of Iraq, it is easier to embark on a policy than to stop it, even for a superpower. = If the sanctions effectively remain in place it is difficult to see the DPRK b= eing willing to implement its side of the bargain.

However, the b= iggest stumbling block is the alleged uranium programme. It was thi= s, it is claimed, that led the US to abandon the Agreed Framework in 2002.&n= bsp; The DPRK has consistently denied having a programme but has agreed to join a working party that reportedly will investigate the issue. Much may depend on the definition = of ‘programme’. It is widely asserted that North Korea, (like South Korea), has worked on uranium enrichment, perhaps for the civilian reactors promised under the Agreed Framework. The best guess is that the DPRK has centrifuges (from Pakistan) but not a meaningful programme for producing weapons-grade uranium. Interestingly, Christopher Hill, t= he US negotiator, and other officials seem to be preparing the ground for a defus= ing of the issue. However, whether the issue can be resolved so easily is quite another matter. If the DPRK h= as a programme, it will be difficult to admit its existence after denying it. On the other hand, if, as likely, = it does not have a programme, then it will be impossible to prove its non-existence, certainly to the satisfaction of American hardliners. Again, it may well be impossible t= o put the genie back into the bottle even if Washington so desires.

Does Washington so desire? The problem is that ‘Washington’= ;, in the sense of a coherent, disciplined, purposeful government scarcely exists. What we have is a vol= atile, shifting alliance of political forces without firm, strategic leadership. What seems to have happened is that Condoleezza Rice was able, in the aftermath of the departure of Rumsfeld an= d Bolton, to isolate Cheney and bypass hardliners in = the government to empower Hill to strike a deal. Whether she will have continued au= thority to implement the deal is another matter. One indication of the difficulty s= he faces is that just at the time Hill was trying to convince the North Koreans that the US was sincere in returning to negotiations, and that the BDA matt= er would be ‘resolved’, other parts of the bureaucracy, within the State Department itself, were launching an attack on the operations of the = UN Development programme in the DPRK.

Although the agreement was trumpete= d by President Bush as a great achievement of his policies, few informed observe= rs, right or left, American or foreign, see it that way. His administration had torn up the Agreed Framework because it claimed the DPRK had a secret urani= um weapons programme. Neither the Joint Statement of 2005 nor the February agr= eement explicitly raise the issue and there are indications that the US is trying to extricate its= elf by admitting ‘doubts’ about the programme. It froze the Joint Statement with = its actions against the Banco Delta Asia, but has back-tracked For years it had refused to = have bilateral negotiations with Py= ongyang, but now it does in all but name. Reports circulate that = Rice may accept an invitation to go to Pyongyang; you can’t get much more bilateral than that. For a long time it insisted that t= he DPRK must have a ‘comp= lete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement’ of its nuclear weapons before= the US would reciprocate in any way. Both the Joint Statement, and the agreement, centralise the North Korean princip= le of ‘action for action’, a sequence of mutual steps.<= /span>

Why the volte-= face? There has been considerable pressure from C= hina, South Korea and Russia. The North Korean nuclear test in October exposed the Bush administration to= the charge that by tearing up the Agreed Framework it had produced the outcome = that Clinton prevented during his tenure. Clearly the administration has its problems at home (as the mid-term elections bluntly confirmed) and more pressing issues abroad, especially in the arc stretching from the Mediterranean through Iraq and I= ran to Pakistan. Globally it has the Islamic ‘global insurgency’, the rise of China and the reinvigoration of Russia. Putting the Korean situation on the backburner, gaining some quietness on the East Asian front to concentrate on the Middle Eastern one, makes= sense even if it comes with its costs to imperial pride. It has also meant rebuff= ing an isolated Abe Shinzo, although it is doubtful this rebuff will have more = than a temporary impact of the US-Japan relationship.

However, it is unlikely that signing the agreement ‘Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement’, and hence returning to the Joint Statement, represents a change in US strategy. It is a tactic to g= ain time to address more important matters rather than a decision to transform = the relationship with the DPRK and to move from hostility to peaceful coexisten= ce. North Korea, for its part, is unlikely to dismantle its nuclear deterrent irreversibly u= ntil it is persuaded that transformation is happening. The rumoured proposed vis= it by Secretary Rice to Pyongyang= , if it comes off, will help, as would the removing of the DPRK from the terrorism list, but it is likely that concrete, and irreversible, measures = will be needed, and that probably means Light Water Reactors (LWRs). Last year t= he United States forced the winding up of the KEDO project to provide LWRs to the DPRK, clea= rly indicating that it considered the Agreed Framework, and the Joint Statement with its promises of LWRs, dead. It is difficult to see that promise being resurrected under the Bush administration.

Handling the n= ew situation will be enormously difficult for Pyongyang. It desperately needs peace w= ith the United States but has calculated that peace will not be produced by weakness. It has handled an immensely strong= er adversary, on the whole, with an adept balance of firmness and flexibility.= The Bush administration, despite, or perhaps because of, America’s far stronger position, faces an even more difficult situation. Its adventurism in the Middle East has been mirrored in its dealings with = the DPRK and extricating itself may prove equally impossible. Negotiations may provide temporary relief but it is unlikely that the US will have the strength to conclude= them and implement the Joint Statement.

Tim Be= al

Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement

13 February 2007

The Third Session of the Fifth Roun= d of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among = the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic= of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation= and the United States of= America from 8 to 13 February 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Fore= ign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of t= he DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representa= tive for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Fore= ign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affai= rs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for E= ast Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chai= red the talks.

I. The Parties held serious and pro= ductive discussions on the actions each party will take in the initial phase for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. The Parties reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization of = the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill their commitments in the Joint Statement. The Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of "action for action".

II. The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase:

1. The DPRK will shut down and seal= for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including th= e reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring= and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.

2. The DPRK will discuss with other= parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.

3. The DPRK and the US will= start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving towa= rd full diplomatic relations. The US will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.

4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral ta= lks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past a= nd the outstanding issues of concern.

5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the= Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivale= nt to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days.

The Parties agreed that the above-m= entioned initial actions will be implemented within next 60 days and that they will = take coordinated steps toward this goal.

III. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement:

1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

2. Normalization of DPRK-US relatio= ns

3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan rela= tions

4. Economy and Energy Cooperation

5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism

The WGs will discuss and formulate = specific plans for the implementation of the Joint Statement in their respective are= as. The WGs shall report to the Six-Party Heads of Delegation Meeting on the progress of their work. In principle, progress in one WG shall not affect progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a whole in a coordinated manner.

The Parties agreed that all WGs wil= l meet within next 30 days.

IV. During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase - which includes provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant - economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent o= f 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equiva= lent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.

The detailed modalities of the said assistance will be determined through consultations and appropriate assessm= ents in the Working Group on Economic and Energy Cooperation.

V. Once the initial actions are implemented, the Six Parties will promptly hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

VI. The Parties reaffirmed that the= y will take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and will make joint efforts f= or lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the= Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

VII. The Parties agreed to hold the= Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 to hear reports of WGs and discuss on actions for the next phase.

Source: Chinese Ministry of F= oreign Affairs

Cheney's Influence Lessens= in Second Term

Administration More Pragmatic in Fo= reign Policy, Dealing With Congress

By Michael Abramowitz

Mistrustful of North Korea and its willingne= ss to keep promises, Vice President Cheney worked hard in President Bush's first = term to prevent talks aimed at halting that country's push to develop a nuclear bomb. At one point three years ago, he even bypassed the State Department to intervene in delicate negotiations over Pyongyang's nuclear activities.

But this month Cheney stayed out of= the way as a top State Department negotiator wrapped up a nuclear agreement with No= rth Korea -- a deal that many of the vice president's conservative allies consi= der foolhardy and that some of his own staff are said to find hard to swallow.<= /span>

The contrast underscores the vice president's shifting status in Washington.

Source: Washington Post, 20 February, 2007

Entering the Reality Zone = on North Korea

Interview= with Graham Allison

Q: What does the agreement represen= t, both in terms of the non-proliferation regime and the overall foreign policy posturing of both Washington and Pyongyang? ..//..

GA: This is a significant step for = the Bush Administration into the reality zone, a strong departure from its previous failed approach and a good first step. So that’s the good news. The b= ad news is that this is four years, eight bombs’ worth of plutonium and = one nuclear test after the Bush Administration departed from this point that it= has inherited essentially from the Clinton Administration.

For North Korea, this represents a = small step, I would say, not a big step, in that it essentially reiterates the position that it had agreed to and which it had complied with in the ‘= ;94 agreement reached by the Clinton Administration that froze the Yongybon reactor. But it does so for a country that has now conducted a nuclear test= . It has ten bombs worth of plutonium and it may or may not have a second alternative: a highly enriched uranium route for producing materials for nuclear bombs. ..//..<= /p>

Q: Under the agreement, North Korea will eventually be required to= list all aspects of its nuclear program, an exercise that could test the Bush Administration’s assertions that North Korea had been developi= ng a uranium nuclear device, an assertion which prompted the Bush Administration= to back away from the Agreed Framework on November 2002. This agreement, shoul= d it actually produce this list by North Korea, could test that Bush Administrati= on assertion on a North Korean uranium bomb program. Is it likely, in your vie= w, that the administration will be validated or that it could suffer another embarrassing illustration of miscalculating on major non-proliferation and intelligence matter?

GA: Information about North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program that could also produce materials for bombs is uncertain because the facility, if it exists, has not been discovered. The basis for believing that there is such a facility comes from what is know a= bout what A.Q. Kahn, the Pakistani nuclear bomb-maker, sold to the North Koreans= . On the basis of that information, it’s a reasonable inference that North Korea has been working on an enriched uranium facility, but where the facility is= and the current status of the facility remains uncertain. In 2002, the Senate g= ot from the CIA an assessment that by the middle of 2005, such a facility migh= t be up and running. So it’s conceivable that there’s such a facility running today, but unknown.

In the current agreement, as descri= bed, North Korea is committed to providing a list of all of its nuclear facilities and materials, but whether and when it will do so remains uncertain. And if it = were to provide an inadequate account of this enriched uranium facility, that’s one of the hundred ways in which between where we now stand and the goal line—which the Bush Administration announced of complete verifiable, irreversible dismantlement, CVID—could again go off the r= ail.

Source: The Nation= al Interest, New York, 13 February 2007

Washin= gton's raw deal

By David = Frum

Something has gone very, very wrong= in this second Bush administration. That is obvious to everyone. One of the few mer= its of this week's North= Korea nuclear deal is that we can get a clearer view of what exactly the problem = is --or should I say, what the problems are?

First problem: The deal demonstrate= s a lethal failure of strategic vision.

The Bush administration entered off= ice determined to take a tougher line on North Korea than Bill Clinton= . In February, 2002, George Bush warned in his "axis of evil" speech t= hat North Korea was arming to threaten world peace. In October 2002, his administration confron= ted the North Koreans with proof that they had cheated on their 1994 deal with = the United States, secretly starting a whole new nuclear program.

All excellent moves --if you have a= plan to follow through. But it turns out: there was no plan.

North Korea responded (predictably) by accelerating its nuclear developme= nt, completing half a dozen bombs and testing a nuclear device in October, 2006. Now, five years after "axis of evil," the Bush administration fin= ds itself signing almost exactly the same deal that the = Clinton administration bequeathed it, w= ith no more safeguards against cheating than before. The only difference is that <= st1:country-region w:st=3D"on">North Korea has become a declared nuclear power in the interim. And it will remain a declar= ed nuclear power: Last week's deal does not call on North Korea to surrender its existing weapons.

All this raises the question: What = was the point of confronting North Korea in the first place?

(Editors&= #8217; note: David Frum drafted the ‘Axis of Evil’ State of the Union address in 2002)

Source: National Post, Toronto, 17 February 2007

Freeze Minus

By Jon Wo= lfsthal

If the new agreement painstakingly negotiated by the United States, North Korea, and the o= ther participants of the six party talks holds, it will be an important mileston= e in efforts to denuclearize North Korea. But in and of itself, the deal is= a nuclear freeze on No= rth Korea’s program. It contains only = the promise, unspecified in time and scope, with no guarantee that the next step will ever be taken. This is neither surprising nor unwelcome. Given the tot= al lack of trust between the United States and North Korea, the two sides have to gain some basic momentum before moving forward. We ha= ve to crawl before we can walk. U.S. government spokesmen will claim in every way possible that this deal is entirely different from the one struck by the Clinton administration in 1994, but the= facts speak for themselves – a freeze is a freeze is a freeze. ..//..

The temptation to score easy (and e= ven gratifying) political points over the about-face taken by the Bush administration will be strong. But for the sake of stability in East Asia, America’s reputation in the region, and in the interest of seeing if nuclear rollback= in North Korea is possible, every effort should be made to support the agreement. If it fails, let it be because North Korea did not live up to its part of the bargain, not because America= did not.

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 13 February 2007 <= /span>

Charade or First Step? The= United States-North Korea Agreement

by Immanu= el Wallerstein

..//..Why did the United States sign [the agreement]? The New York Times said that the agreement "mark= s a major change of course for the Bush administration" and clearly Bolton agrees. So do most other commentators. It ha= s been pointed out that the agreement is quite close to that reached by the Clinton administr= ation and denounced by the Bush regime. Most commentators also agree that this agreement could probably have been reached five years ago, at a moment when= North Korea had not yet tested nuclear weapons, had the Bush regime been willing.

So, what has changed? The reality of declining options seems to have hit decision-makers in Washington. The fact is that North Korea now has some weapons and it is doubtful they will give them up. The fact is tha= t the United States is bogge= d down in Iraq and is concent= rating its other immediate political energies on <= st1:place w:st=3D"on">Iran. The fact is that the Republicans lost the last election, largely over foreign policy issues. The fact is that its allies become less amenable to United States policies as eac= h day goes by. From a Unit= ed States point of view, the agreement remo= ves the issue from the front of the geopolitical scene temporarily. There will = be ample opportunity for the United States to backtrack later…//..

Source: Fernand Braudel Center, Bingha= mton University, Commentary No. 204, Mar. 1, 2007

Renewed fears of secret uranium enrichment by North Korea

By Anna F= ifield in Seoul <= /span>

Suspicions over whether Pyongyang has been running a secret ura= nium enrichment programme are back in the spotlight after last week's apparent breakthrough in the long-running North Korean nuclear crisis.

Just as concerns about possible ura= nium enrichment triggered the current crisis, they are again threatening to undermine the agreement under which North Korea will receive step-by-step rewards in return for declaring and then disabling its nuclear weapons programme.

The issue could be a "deal breaker", says William Perry, the US defence secretary under President Bill Clinton. "Much more remains to be done. Two months from now, we will know whether we have a reasonable probability of completing the agreement."..//..

The current nuclear crisis erupted = in October 2002, when Washington charged Pyongyang with ob= taining uranium enrichment technology from A Q Khan, the rogue Pakistani scientist,= and operating a secret enrichment programme.

James Kelly, the chief US nuclear negotiator at the time, said the North Koreans admitted the charge but Pyongyang has denied having any such programme. ..//..

With the US having staked the entire nuclear issue on the uranium claim and North Korea continuing to deny the existence of any such programme, diplomats are seeki= ng ways to prevent the issue derailing the first signs of progress in years. <= b>..//..

The Bush administration had already "backed down" on the uranium issue, said Joel Wit, a former State Department official who helped negotiate the nuclear-freeze deal with North Korea in 1994. "This is not because the administration has become wimp= ish and has decided to put it aside, but because they did not have any informat= ion and started to wonder whether they had been accurate in the first place,&qu= ot; he said...//..

Jonathan Pollack, a professor at th= e US Naval War College, dismissed the concern that North Korea might ultimately = use uranium as an alternative source of fissile material.

"Pyongyang pursued this option= in transactions with A Q Khan; it also sought to procure substantial quantitie= s of industrial materials needed for an enrichment programme through black marke= ts in Europe," he wrote in the Asia Policy journal. "Yet there is st= ill no definitive evidence of a proven production capability, and it is possible that North Korea long ago shelved major efforts to develop one."

Source: = Financial Times 22 February 2007

U.S. acknowledges gaps on N.Korea nuclear program

By Carol = Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United S= tates on Thursday acknowledged gaps in its knowledge about the covert uranium enrich= ment program it has long accused Py= ongyang of pursuing.

Chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill sa= id such a program, which could produce fuel for nuclear weapons, would require &quo= t;a lot more equipment than we know that they have actually purchased" as = well as "some considerable production techniques that we're not sure whether they have mastered."

He also raised the possibility that aluminum tubes the United States believes North Korea= acquired for an enrichment program several years ago may have gone "somewhere else."

But Hill, speaking at the Brookings Institution, insisted "the North Koreans made certain purchases of equipment which is entirely consistent with a highly enriched uranium program."

A former U.S. official told Reuters= the data gaps cited by Hill have existed since 2002 when the Bush administration first disclosed the enrichment program but this may be the first time they = have been publicly acknowledged…//..

Source: Reuters 22 February

U.S. Had Doubts on North Korean Uranium Drive

By David E. Sanger and William J. B= road

WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 — Last October, the North Koreans tested their= first nuclear device, the fruition of decades of work to make a weapon out of plutonium.

For nearly five years, though, the = Bush administration, based on intelligence estimates, has accused North Korea of also pursuing a secret, parallel path to a bomb, using enriched uranium. Th= at accusation, first leveled in the fall of 2002, resulted in the rupture of an already tense relationship: The United States cut off oil supplies, and the North Koreans responded by throwing out international inspectors, building = up their plutonium arsenal and, ultimately, producing that first plutonium bom= b.

But now, American intelligence offi= cials are publicly softening their position, admitting to doubts about how much progress the uranium enrichment program has actually made. The result has b= een new questions about the Bush administration’s decision to confront North Korea in 2002. ..//..

It is unclear why the new assessmen= t is being disclosed now. But some officials suggested that the timing could be linked to North Kore= a’s recent agreement to reopen its doors to international arms inspectors. As a result, these officials have said, the intelligence agencies are facing the possibility that their assessments will once again be compared to what is a= ctually found on the ground. “This may be preventative,” one American diplomat said…//..

Source: New York Times, 1 March 2007

Rice Is Said to Have Speeded North Korea Deal

By David = E. Sanger and Thom Shanker

WASHINGTON, Feb. 15 — To win = approval of a deal with North Korea that has been assailed by conservatives inside a= nd outside the administration, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice bypassed la= yers of government policy review that had derailed past efforts to negotiate an agreement, several senior administration officials said this week.

After a meeting in Berlin in mid-Ja= nuary with her top negotiator on North Korea, Christopher R. Hill, who had just h= eld lengthy sessions with his North Korean counterparts, Ms. Rice called back to Washington to describe the outlines of the deal to Stephen J. Hadley, the national security adviser, and then to President Bush.

But to some, it seemed the usual pr= ocedures were cut short — vetting the details though an interagency process th= at ordinarily would have brought in Vice President Dick Cheney’s office,= the Defense Department and aides at the White House and other agencies who had previously objected to rewarding North Korea before it gives u= p its weapons.

“There was no process here,&#= 8221; said an official who has been deeply involved in the issue. “Nothing. There was no airing of whether this is the way to deal with the North Koreans.”

White House and other administration officials dispute that, saying that all relevant agencies were consulted.

In lieu of the formal meetings where objections to such accords were usually voiced during the president’s first term, Mr. Hadley “walked it through with concerned people,̶= 1; a senior administration official said. The official acknowledged that the pro= cess was much more informal, and rapid, than usual, although much of Mr. Hill’s work was built upon previous negotiations at the talks that had been widely vetted across the administration.

The result has been an unusual atta= ck on the agreement from the right, starting with John R. Bolton, the former ambassador to the United Nations who takes a tough stance on North Korea issues. He said b= luntly that it was a “bad deal,” and expressed the hope that it would = fall apart before being carried out.

State Department officials said tha= t Robert Joseph, the under secretary of state for arms control and disarmament, vehemently disagreed with the approach, telling associates privately what M= r. Bolton has said in public: that the new agreement was no better, and perhaps worse, than one signed by President Clinton in 1994. Mr. Joseph, who announ= ced last month that he would resign soon, declined to comment Thursday.<= /p>

Source: New York= Times 16 February 2007

The nightmare of the Korean nuclear crisis over

By Dmitry= Kosyrev

Washington has capitulated at the six-nation talks on the North Korean n= uclear problem in Beijing<= /st1:place>, an outcome that has been expected since the beginning of the crisis in 2002= .

The world waited for the Bush administration to admit its failure or pass the difficult task to the next president.

The current U.S. administration, which needs good news now more than any other government, h= as agreed to defreeze North Korea's $24-million account with a Macao bank despite its previous accusations of <= st1:City w:st=3D"on">Pyongyang printing counterfeit U.S. dollars.

There are PR experts who can presen= t Washington's diplomatic capitulation as its victory= and Pyongyang's defea= t. This can be done because few people now remember that the conflict began with unsubstantiated U.S. accusations, or know about the situation in North Korea at that time.

They would be surprised to learn th= at the situation in that Far Eastern country has not changed since the beginning of the crisis. Pyongyang has again agreed to shut down its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in return for international aid, and to grant IAEA inspectors access to it.

In other words, North Korea has resumed the obligations it honored before t= he Bush administration, which had not had the benefit of the Iraqi experience = at the time, opted for a new policy towards North Korea aimed at changing= the regime.

Source: RIA Novosti, Mos= cow, 14 February 2007

Tug of war with shorter rope

Hard-liners working to trip up nucl= ear talks

By Leon V= . Sigal

The Bush administration has struck = a deal to get North Korea to suspend making plutonium for more nuclear weapons. It can get farther do= wn the road to denuclearization if it continues to engage in direct diplomatic give-and-take and reconcile with the North.

But not if the hard-liners in Washington have = their way. They insist Pyongyang will never live up to its pledge, made in the September 2005 round of six-p= arty talks, to abandon "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs." Their belief is faith-based. How can they be so sure?..//..=

Hard-liners began crowing that they= finally had Pyongyang where they wanted it, but when President Bush took office, the North had stopped testing longer-range missiles, had one or two bombs' worth of plutonium, and was verifiably not making more. After six years of fanaticis= m on both sides, it had seven to nine bombs' worth, had resumed testing missiles, and had little reason to restrain itself from nuclear testing or, worse, generating more plutonium. Is that where the hard-liners wanted North Korea to be?

Bush did not. At last, he was ready= to negotiate in earnest. It will be much harder now to convince North Korea that the U.S. is ready to end enmity. = They will not settle for words; they will insist on concrete actions. They are prepared to reciprocate if and when Washington cooperates. Only time and perseverance will tell if they are willing to giv= e up their nuclear weapons.

Source: Chicago Tribune, 15 February, 2007

Wolfgang Rosenberg

Born Berlin, 4 January, 1915;

died Christchurch, 16 February, 2007.

Don Borrie remembers Woof

It is with a sense of gratitude and= sadness that on my return from the DPRK I learnt of Woof's death.

A major influential thinker and tea= cher in the field of economics we, in the NZ DPRK Society are indebted to Woof for = his inspiration and leadership when in the early 1970's, he saw the importance of establishing a DPRK-NZ relationship. Thanks to his enthusiasm I had the confidence to join with him in co-founding the NZ DPRK Society and shortly afterwards had the pleasure of travelling with him to be the first NZrs to make personal conta= ct with the DPRK since the US - Korean War.

Growing out of his previous German experience, Woof began a study of the two Korean economic systems which, du= ring the 1970s, he shared with colleagues both in the DPRK and NZ. Arising from these studies he was convinced of the uniqueness of the Korean situation and the wisdom of the DPRK approach to peaceful reunification.

A man of great compassion and humil= ity Woof has been first and foremost a close and much loved friend to so many of us, including myself. What contribution I have been able to make to achieve international peace with justice, not least in Korea and New Zealand, has been inspired by the presence and personal affection so freely given by Woof. As we share our support with Woof's wife Ann and family I conclude wi= th the same ending Woof would conclude his letters of encouragement and gratitude.....simply, Love

(Other ob= ituaries can be found at http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/dprk/NK_NZ.htm)

Tractor donated to NZ Korea Friendship Farm

In early 2004, the Haksan Cooperati= ve Farm was designated as the NZ-DPRK Friendship Farm in order to celebrate three y= ears of diplomatic relations between NZ and DPRK. The farm is about 20km from the Capital City of the DPRK, Pyongyang.

In 2005 a delegation from the NZ-DP= RK Friendship Society, which included an agriculturalist, visited the Friendsh= ip Farm. The objective of the visit was to build understanding on a person to person level, as well as to provide some humanitarian assistance. This will= not only benefit the 860 families working on the cooperative but will also contribute to an increase in food production for the country as a whole.

After discussions with the Farm man= agement, the New Zealand members of the Society undertook to find funds for a number of projects whi= ch would help the farm.

During 2005/2006 funds were raised = to purchase suitable text books in Korean on agricultural subjects for the use= of the Friendship Farm Management Team. Fund raising was also undertaken to bu= y a tractor.

A handing over ceremony for the tra= ctor and was held at the Friendship Farm on 1^st October 2006. The Chairma= n of the NZ-DPRK Society, the Rev. Don Borrie, sent a message which was read to = the Farm management, guests from New Zealand and members of the Korea-New Zea= land Friendship Society of the DPRK who were present.

The manager of the Haksan Farm rece= ived the tractor and expressed his gratitude. He commented that the tractor was eagerly anticipated by the members= of the cooperative farm and would be put to immediate use in vegetable product= ion.

The visitors enjoyed a brief walk a= round the farm village and observed the harvest activities and were shown the facilities in the village.

The tractor is a 28hp diesel Naenar= a, manufactured in the DPRK, complete with cab for protection of the operator during cold winter weather and a 3 furrow plough.

Since the tractor was donated, anot= her project has been fulfilled. An improved water supply for the piggery has be= en provided. This is essential for the hygiene and welfare of the pigs. An emergency grant of $NZ1000 was given for fertiliser for this year. We owe a special thanks to the Global Mission Office of the Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa New Zealand for their assistanc= e.

The next project is to purchase a t= ruck to enable produce to be taken from the farm from Pyongyang, among other uses. This will = cost around $NZ10,000. We hope also to provide plastic sheeting for seedlings for which we are budgeting $NZ1,200. These projects are all relatively inexpens= ive but very significant steps towards increased food production on the farm. T= hey also build up personal friendships and allow for increasing understanding between New Zealand<= /st1:country-region> and the DPRK. The projects are practical expressions of humanitarian assist= ance based on New Zealand= expertise in agricultural areas.

If you wish to contribute financial= ly, or otherwise, or would like some more information, please contact Stuart Vogel= at s.vogel@xtra.co.nz.

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